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ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE BUREAU OF
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
By Susan Block-Lieb*
INTRODUCTION
Industry and political actors oppose the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (the Bureau or CFPB) on the grounds that its institutional design
ensures its lack of accountability.1 When complaining about the Bureau’s
lack of accountability, opponents point primarily to the CFPB’s regulatory
and financial independence, and to the fact that a single director heads the
Bureau rather than a bipartisan panel of commissioners.2 Based on these
complaints, the House of Representatives passed a bill in 2011 to strengthen
the authority of the Council on Financial Stability to set aside regulations issued by the Bureau.3 Earlier, the Senate—well, really a cadre of
Republican senators—vowed to filibuster the appointment of any director to
the new CFPB.4 By the time the Bureau “went live” on the date set by the
Dodd-Frank Act, the Senate still had not consented to the President’s
nomination of Richard Cordray as Director for the CFPB. 5 Rather than
allow this political hijacking to stymie the Bureau altogether, President
Obama appointed Cordray under his recess appointments powers. 6 As
might be imagined, Cordray’s recess appointment has not endeared the
CFPB or its efforts to regulate consumers’ financial decision-making to the

* Cooper Family Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Ted
Janger and all the participants at the conference held at Brooklyn Law School to consider the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau one year after its creation.
1. See, e.g., David Hirschmann, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Needs More
Accountability, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2011, 9:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211
/69992.html (President of U.S. Chamber of Commerce arguing that “in creating the CFPB last
year, Congress exempted this new agency from virtually all the normal checks and balances” and
proposing three reforms to restructure the design of the Bureau); Neil Weinberg, Why Dodd-Frank
is Regulatory Overkill, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2011, at 9-9, available at http://www
.americanbanker.com/bankthink/dodd-frank-weinberg-1042465-1.html; Press Release, House Fin.
Servs. Comm’n, Chair Bacchus Comments on Legal Challenge to Dodd-Frank Act (June 21,
2012), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID
=300403 (“As it is currently structured, the CFPB is one of the most powerful and least
accountable agencies in all of Washington.”).
2. Hirschmann, supra note 1.
3. H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-89, at pt. I (May 25, 2011)
(House Report accompanying passage of H.R. 1315).
4. See Ylan Q. Mui, GOP’s Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority Leader, Stands by Vow to
Block CFPB Nominees, WASH. POST, June 10, 2011, at A12.
5. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordray
-named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html?pagewanted=all.
6. Id. The President’s recess appointments powers are found in article II, section 2, clause 2,
of the U.S. Constitution.

26

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

political right. 7 Cordray’s recess appointment as Director arguably permitted the President to evade Senate review of his appointment, further
reducing the Director’s accountability to Congress.8
To what extent are these objections justified? Is the CFPB accountable
to no one?
This essay argues that concerns about the CFPB’s lack of accountability
are partly right and mostly wrong. Congressional critics correctly note that
the structure of the CFPB differs from other independent administrative
agencies. A single director heads the Bureau, rather than a panel of
commissioners appointed for fixed (and often staggered) terms as normally
govern independent agencies.9 In addition, the Bureau’s annual budget is
virtually guaranteed and nearly free from congressional revision, although
most independent agencies have to seek funding from Congress and often
face annual appropriations battles.10
But to focus on the Bureau’s financial independence and single director
is to miss the distinct political deal struck when Congress created the CFPB.
Typically, an administrative agency is structured as an independent agency
in order to insulate regulators from interest group influence. 11 Because
capture often is accomplished through political channels, in the past,
7. This summer, suit was brought claiming that Cordray’s recess appointment is
unconstitutional. See Suzy Khimm, Obama’s Consumer Watchdog Gets Sued, WASH. POST (June
22, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/22/obamas-consumerwatchdog-gets-sued/.
8. The D.C. Circuit recently struck down adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board
on the basis that President Obama appointed three members of the Board in contravention of the
appointments and recess appointments clauses of the U.S. Constitution. See Canning v. NLRB,
Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (construing Recess
Appointments Clause of Constitution to allow such appointment only during intersessional
recesses of the Senate and only then to vacancies that “happen” because it first “comes into being”
during such a recess; because three members of the Board were appointed in violation of these
requirements, the court held that the Board acted ultra vires without the requisite quorum). The
D.C. Circuit’s decision creates a circuit conflict on this issue. See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d
1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the Recess” includes intrasessional recesses and
upholding judicial appointment under Recess Appointments Clause), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942
(2005). How the D.C. Circuit’s opinion might affect rulemaking and Directorial actions by the
CFPB remains unclear. Compare Adam Levitin, NLRB and CFPB: Recess Appointments, CREDIT
SLIPS (Jan. 25, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/01/nlrb-and-cfpbrecess-appointments.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed
%3A+creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29, with Deephak Gopta, The CFPB and the Recess
Appointment: DeFacto Officer Doctrine to the Rescue?, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog
/2013/01/the-cfpb-and-the-recess-appointment-de-facto-officer-doctrine-to-the-rescue.html.
9. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1137–39 (2000).
10. Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822,
1823 (2012).
11. Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89
TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (noting that “the creation of an independent agency is often motivated
by a concern with agency capture”).
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independent agencies also have been structured to be insulated from
executive pressure.12 Creating an independent commission with a bipartisan
panel of commissioners holding staggered terms would insulate bureaucrats
from this sort of influence.13
Industry influence was considered to be a contributing factor to the
subprime mortgage crisis.14 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found
that regulators were aware of the marketing and mass distribution of
subprime mortgages and, due to industry pressure and ideological myopia,
determined to do nothing.15 Congress sought to prevent the possibility of
further influence of this sort with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).16
Uniquely, the CFPB is structured to insulate this independent agency
not only from interest group influence and executive interference, but also
from congressional reversal. That is, Congress intentionally designed the
Bureau to insulate it somewhat from direct congressional control.
This feature of the CFPB’s design, while unusual, is not antidemocratic; it is precisely what the democratically elected Congress that
enacted the Dodd-Frank Act sought to accomplish. Like Ulysses tied to the
mast, the institutional design of the Bureau works like a pre-commitment
device. All pre-commitment devices involve accountability deficits—that is
precisely the point.
Tying up Congress’ ability to interfere with consumer financial
protection regulation made particular sense in this context. Given its diffuse
benefits and narrowly defined costs, consumer protection legislation has
always been difficult to enact and even more difficult to enforce.17 These
“client politics” can and have given way,18 especially in periods of crisis, to
permit enactment.19 In this case, the CFPB was created in reaction to the
subprime mortgage crisis. 20 With the help of several political entrepre12. See id. at 19–21.
13. Recent Legislation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2128 (2011).
14. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at
xvii (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (discussion of industry influence); Barkow, supra note 11,
at 54.
15. FCIC REPORT, supra note 14, at xviii.
16. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 72–73, 74.
17. See, e.g., Peter Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY
L.J. 587, 623–57 (1995).
18. James Q. Wilson first coined the term “client politics,” which refers to the politics of
issues with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 76 (1991). Wilson distinguished “client politics” from
“entrepreneurial politics” involving diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. Id. at 77. Wilson’s
insights derive in large part from earlier economic work by Mancur Olson. See MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971).
19. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuate, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1029 (2012).
20. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 227–28 (2011).
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neurs,21 congressional forces succeeded in countering opposition from the
financial industry to enact the Dodd-Frank Act.22 But once the fever from
this crisis diminishes, the diffuse benefits and narrowly defined costs of
regulation suggest that the Bureau’s efforts to adopt and enforce consumer
financial protection regulation will confront the same concentrated
opposition that made creation of the Bureau seem unlikely.23 The CFPB’s
independence is intended to make congressional interference more difficult.
Moreover, the Bureau’s “accountability deficits” are not especially
troubling. By statutory design, the CFPB shares its regulatory space with
numerous political actors.24 Because it is indirectly accountable to a wide
range of both political and industry interests, the CFPB is less likely to
promulgate overreaching regulations that protect consumer interests to the
detriment of all else.
The remainder of this essay supports the argument sketched out above,
and proceeds as follows. Part I is descriptive. It briefly recounts the
Bureau’s creation story to contrast the web of federal and state agencies
previously vested with jurisdiction over consumer financial protection with
the current regulatory space set out by Dodd-Frank.
Part II explains the importance of the Bureau’s independence from
Congress. This independence “mirrors” the consensus that existed upon
Dodd-Frank’s passage.25 Congress designed the CFPB so that the Bureau
21. The CFPB is well understood to be the brainchild of two law professors: Oren Bar-Gil and
Elizabeth Warren. See Oren Bar-Gil & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (2008); see also, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 72; Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J.
Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38 FORD. URB. L.J. 681, 692
(2011).
22. President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into law on July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall
Street Reform: “No Easy Task,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easytask.
23. John Coffee calls this toing-and-froing the “Regulatory Sine Curve.” Coffee, supra note
19, at 1029–30. His intuition that financial regulation ebbs and flows between periods of crisis and
amnesia regarding the last crisis event is widely shared, however. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey,
Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance:
The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 972–73 (2005) (“Crisis
. . . created the ‘policy window’ through which political entrepreneurs could launch their
initiatives. Moreover, the regulation that we observe at a particular juncture in time is not
permanently in place. As political pressures change, as a result of exogenous events and
technological change, so too will regulation.”).
24. The term “shared regulatory space” belongs to Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi. See, e.g.,
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131 (2012).
25. Political scientists use the term “mirroring” to describe politicians’ tendency to “create a
decision-making environment in an agency in which the distribution of influence among
constituencies reflects the political forces that gave rise to the agency’s legislative mandate.”
McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive
and Administrative Agencies, at 1713, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell
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would be insulated from congressional meddling but still answerable to
other important political actors—in particular, other prudential regulators
and the President. This design serves to counteract the “client politics” that
are likely to be involved in any financial regulation, particularly consumer
financial protection regulation, which only diffusely benefits the consumers
it looks to protect.26 The CFPB’s independence has been controversial. This
section also discusses industry and political complaints regarding the
Bureau’s institutional design and broad jurisdiction that have arisen since
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, including various bills introduced in
Congress to “reform” the newly constituted CFPB.
Whether the CFPB will succeed in withstanding industry pressure and
political forces remains to be seen and depends, to a large extent, on
whether the CFPB can, in practical effect, be held accountable to political
and economic opponents while preserving this independence. Part III
returns to Dodd-Frank, the legislation that created the CFPB, to tackle the
issue of the Bureau’s likely responsiveness to these concerns when
promulgating and enforcing regulations. Combing through the statute, this
section details the ex ante and ex post regulatory limits on the Bureau’s
authority. Through these political and procedural limits, this section finds
that the CFPB is both independent and accountable. It finds that the CFPB
is accountable to Congress and to the prudential regulators that possess
overlapping jurisdiction. Industry actors and consumer advocates will have
a say on the regulations the Bureau proposes. Its independence, thus,
involves a carefully calibrated balancing of interests in tension.
I. EMERGENCE OF THE CFPB
The Dodd-Frank Act created the new Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection and granted it authority both to regulate consumer finance
transactions and monitor and enforce these and other regulations.27 DoddFrank shifted pre-existing regulatory authority that had been scattered
among several federal regulators to one federal agency, the CFPB, with
exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate regulations regarding the federal
consumer financial protection laws and primary jurisdiction to monitor and
enforce those laws. 28 With this shift, Dodd-Frank affected the source of
Polinsky & Stephen Shavell eds., 2007); see also, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 243, 262 (1987).
26. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the term “client politics”).
27. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 21, at 700–03.
28. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 227–28. The “federal consumer financial laws” is a
defined term within Dodd-Frank, which includes the “enumerated consumer laws,” another
defined term, plus Dodd-Frank’s provisions. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1002(14),
1002(12), 124 Stat 1367, 1957 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481 (2010)). While the DoddFrank Act grants the Bureau exclusive authority to promulgate regulations to protect consumers’
financial transactions, id. § 1022(b)(4) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512), it grants the Bureau only
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rulemaking authority, as well as the location of monitoring and enforcement
of these rules.
Few substantive changes were effected with this legislative enactment,
however. Instead, Dodd-Frank left substantive changes to consumer
financial protection regulation in the hands of this newly constituted
Bureau. Congress’ shift in jurisdiction over regulatory enforcement in this
way is best explained in the context of recent history.
This history of consumer financial protection has seen its laws scattered
across more than a dozen different federal and fifty states’ laws. Congress
first enacted consumer protection regulation with the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act) in 1914.29 Its 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments
to the FTC Act broadly permitted the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
regulate “unfair and deceptive” practices, without need to prove that the
practices affected competition.30 A number of state legislatures had enacted
their own “Little FTC Acts” and other statutes regulating unfair and
deceptive practices, which from time to time have been applied to unfair or
deceptive practices in consumer lending.31 In addition, starting in 1968 with
the Truth in Lending Act,32 Congress enacted roughly fourteen other federal
consumer financial laws.33
shared authority to enforce consumer financial protection regulation. See id. §§ 1024(c), 1025(c),
1026(d) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(c), 5515(c), 5516(d)). The Bureau shares its enforcement
authority over nondepository consumer lenders with the Federal Trade Commission (the FTC).
See id. § 1024(c). As to consumer lenders that are depository institutions, the Bureau enjoys
exclusive federal enforcement authority over “too big to fail” banks, see id. § 1025(c), but has
limited authority to enforce consumer financial protection regulations against other banks—as to
these, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) may enjoy exclusive federal
enforcement authority. See id. § 1026(d). Moreover, Dodd-Frank reserves substantial authority for
state attorneys general to enforce federal consumer financial protection regulations against
depository and nondepository consumer lenders. See id. §§ 1041, 1042, 1044–1046 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 5551, 5552, 5554–5556). For discussion of the differences in the enforcement
relationships between the Bureau and banking regulators, on one hand, and the Bureau and the
FTC, on the other, see infra text accompanying notes 162–187.
29. Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2011)).
30. Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, ch. 601, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111–12 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 45) (amending FTC Act § 5(a)).
31. State law often also governs consumer financial protection. Often these state statutes
prohibit “unfair and deceptive practices” (UDAP); some state laws list express practices that are
prohibited, while others set an open-ended standard for prohibited practices and leave definition of
the standard either to the FTC or to state courts, or both. For detailed discussion of these UDAP
statutes, see, e.g., Anthony Paul Dunbar, Comment, Consumer Protection: The Practical
Effectiveness of State Deceptive Practices Statutes, 59 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1984). Enforcement of
this body of state law was complicated by preemption regulations issued by the OCC and the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in the 1990s. For discussion of these regulations and Supreme
Court case law considering the propriety of this preemption through regulation, see infra text
accompanying notes 42–43.
32. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, §§ 101–145, 82 Stat. 146, 146–59
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2011)).
33. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(12), 124 Stat. at 1957 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481) (listing
and citing to these “enumerated consumer laws”).
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Rulemaking authority was also spread across multiple federal
agencies. 34 Although the FTC is expressly precluded from regulating the
practices of banks and other similar financial institutions,35 it nonetheless
has construed its jurisdiction to permit regulation of the unfair and
deceptive financial practices of other sorts of consumer lenders. 36 The
federal agencies charged with regulating these federally chartered
depositary institutions similarly prohibit unfair and deceptive practices, 37
although these prudential regulators did not exercise their jurisdiction to
regulate unfair or deceptive practices until after 2008.38 In addition to this
authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices, Congress granted the
Federal Reserve Board (the Fed or Board) jurisdiction to promulgate
regulations to implement most of the federal consumer financial laws.39
Regulation is only effective if it is enforced. Before enactment of DoddFrank, enforcement of consumer financial protection laws had been shared
by a number of federal and state regulators. Regulatory jurisdiction
depended on the nature of the lender. 40 Federal enforcement authorities
included the FTC (so long as the consumer lender was not a federally
34. See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU (CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 2 (2012) (noting that before Dodd-Frank
created the CFPB, “the authority to write rules to implement the majority of the federal consumer
financial protection laws, the power to enforce these laws, and the supervisory authority over the
individuals and companies offering and selling consumer financial products and services were
predominately shared by five different banking regulators, as well as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)”).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). Congress amended the FTC Act in 1975 to give the OCC,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the federal prudential regulators (together
referred to as the Agencies) jurisdiction to enforce the FTC Act and its regulations as to banks,
savings associations, and credit unions. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. II, sec. 202(a), § 108(f)(1), (f)(2), 88 Stat.
2183, 2196 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1)) [hereinafter 1975 Amendments] (adding
§ 18(f)(1) to FTC Act). These Agencies did not exercise their FTC Act rulemaking authority for
more than twenty-five years. See, e.g., James Huizinga, Michael McEneney, John van de Weert &
Karl Kaufmann, UDAP Regulations for Credit Card Issuers, 64 BUS. LAW. 639, 640 (2009); Julie
L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: Federal Banking Agency Enforcement of
the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by Banks, 58 BUS. LAW. 1243 (2003).
36. See, e.g., FTC Regulation Concerning Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses,
16 C.F.R. 433.1, 433.2, 40 Fed. Reg. No. 223, 53506 (Nov. 18, 1975) (FTC’s holder in due course
rule).
37. See CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 2.
38. See Huizinga, et al., supra note 35, at 640.
39. See CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 2; TILA, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 146, 148
(1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1604), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No 111-203,
§ 1100A, 124 Stat. 1376, 2107–09 (2010) (replacing the Board’s authority to promulgate rules
with that of the CFPB).
40. Moreover, a lender’s “nature” could be changed by the simple expedient of a change in
registration. State-chartered banks that found their regulators too nosy and intrusive might reemerge as a federally chartered entity. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 159–160; see also,
e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45 (noting that “banks and thrifts have a great deal of
flexibility in determining whom they wish to be chartered by, and it has little effect on their
business plans”).
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chartered bank or some other federally regulated financial institution)41 or
the prudential regulator charged with authority over the consumer lender (if
the lender was a regulated financial institution).42 In theory, state banking
regulators and state attorneys general also held jurisdiction to enforce state
and possibly federal laws—unless the lender was a federally chartered bank
or otherwise subject to federal banking regulation—but in 2004, this source
of state enforcement largely evaporated. The Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
promulgated regulations preempting state enforcement actions. 43 These
regulations were broad in reach, applying not only to federally chartered
thrifts and banks, but also to state-chartered entities that were operating
subsidiaries of federally chartered thrifts or banks.44
Consumers are themselves another source of enforcement authority, at
least theoretically. While courts had early on held that the FTC Act did not
create a private right of action, 45 most of the federal consumer financial
laws expressly permitted suit. 46 Indeed, many of these statutes explicitly
granted consumers the right to bring a class action;47 where actual damages
could not be established, statutory damages were instead expressly
available.48 Although these statutes imposed limits on the statutory damages
that might have been recovered in the case of a class action, the limits were
themselves generous. 49 No one argues that consumers provide anything
more than a second-best means for enforcement of the federal consumer
finance laws, however. Consumers are a diffuse and under-financed
source of regulatory enforcement.50 Although some of the federal consumer
financial statutes sought to encourage consumers to bring watch-dog actions
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Moreover, banks (but not other lenders) might
have a range of federal charters to choose from based, in part, on the extent of the regulation and
the breadth of regulatory authority that came along with the choice. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2011).
44. Id. In Watters v. Wachovia, N.A., the Supreme Court upheld the OCC’s preemption
regulation as applied to the jurisdiction of state banking authorities over state-chartered operating
subsidiaries of national banks. Watters v. Wachovia, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007).
45. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding
that private litigants cannot sue for violations of the FTC Act).
46. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1679g(a) (2012) (providing liability when a Credit Repair
Organization fails to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1693); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (creating liability for
willful noncompliance with credit reporting regulations in 15 U.S.C. § 1681); 15 U.S.C. § 1681o
(creating liability for negligent noncompliance with credit reporting regulations in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (providing liability for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1693); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a) (providing liability for debt collectors who fail to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692).
47. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679g(a)(2)(B), 1691e(2), 1692k(a)(2)(B), 1693m(a)(2)(B).
48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (providing statutory damages).
49. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (capping class action claims at the “lesser of $500,000 or 1
per centum of the net worth of the debt collection”); 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a)(2)(B) (capping class
action claims at the “lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the defendant”).
50. See, e.g., Letsou, supra note 17, at 650.
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by authorizing class actions and awarding statutory damages, courts cut
back on these encouragements from time to time.51
The subprime mortgage crisis, thus, occurred despite the existence of a
plethora of federal and state regulators with jurisdiction to enforce broad
consumer financial protection regulation. While the sheer number of
enforcers might have resulted in too much enforcement of existing
consumer financial protection laws, in practice the result was too little
enforcement (too little, at least, with the benefit of hindsight).52 This underenforcement of the federal consumer finance laws might have been
predicted simply from the number of agencies with overlapping
enforcement authority. 53 While several agencies might have proceeded
against a lender’s unfair or deceptive practice, none did, perhaps thinking
that the other would.54
Negative common pool problems could plague any shared regulatory
space, but these regulatory misincentives were exacerbated by the
governance structure of at least some of the prudential regulators.55 Neither
the OCC nor the OTS received funding from Congress, instead paying for
their bureaucratic budgets by means of fees paid by the entities they
regulated. 56 This fee-paid regulatory system created a situation ripe for
capture by members of the financial industry. If banks regulated by the
OCC looked favorably at the regulatory terrain offered by the OTS, they
simply re-chartered as thrifts to migrate from OCC to OTS jurisdiction. Rechartering created incentives for the OCC to “compete” with the regulatory
package offered to thrifts by the OTS so that it could retain its bank
“clients” and perhaps even encourage some thrifts to re-charter as banks
and come under the OCC’s umbrella. While in most markets competition is
a force that benefits consumers, competition between the OCC and OTS
instead created incentives for a regulatory “race to the bottom”—a race to
see who could regulate less.57
State regulators did not face the same misincentives. Indeed, states’
attorneys general learned that political capital might be earned in the eyes of
the electorate (particularly the electorate in “blue states” like New York and
51. See, e.g., Gene & Gene LLC v. Biopay LLC, 541 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying class
certification because the action did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class
certification).
52. See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 162 (concluding that OCC and OTS
preemption rules “turned the playing field into one ‘with no rules’”).
53. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
54. See id. at 7, 22, 37 (positing that overregulation creates a “disincentive to address social
ills” when “a social ill is juxtaposed against a fragmented or overlapping legal or political
setting”).
55. Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 159–162
(describing the process of “charter shopping” by financial industry actors).
56. Barkow, supra note 11, at 44.
57. Id. at 44–45, 45 n.164.

34

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

Illinois) if they succeeded in beating up on subprime lenders. They looked
to bring suit against consumer lenders, but found they had more luck suing
insurance companies than banks. OCC and OTS preemption regulations
created high hurdles to states’ action.58 State regulators brought litigation
that challenged the authority of the OCC and OTS to issue preemption
regulations—suits that eventually found their way to the Supreme Court—
but this litigation was extremely time consuming and initially unsuccessful.
State banking authorities lost in Watters, the first such suit.59 State attorneys
general fared much better, prevailing in Cuomo on a slightly different issue,
but did not achieve this victory until 2010—well too late to prevent the
subprime mortgage crisis from spreading to create havoc in other financial
markets.60 In the interim, the crisis had burned unchecked by either federal
regulators or their state counterparts. Attorneys general did not become a
source of regulatory enforcement until after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cuomo and after the enactment of Dodd-Frank.
Thus, while there were more than a half-dozen federal regulators with
jurisdiction to enforce the federal consumer finance laws, 61 none did so
until after the subprime mortgage crisis grew to become a prime mortgage
crisis, and then a liquidity crisis that has, since at least late 2008, triggered a
systemic financial crisis of truly global proportion. Given this distaste for
enforcement of the federal consumer finance laws, bureaucrats’ disinterest
in promulgating stronger consumer financial protection regulation also
became clear. As noted above, the FTC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and
prudential regulators might have issued regulations to clarify whether (or
when) certain terms in subprime mortgages created unfair or deceptive
lending practices.62 Consumer advocates had long pressed for this sort of
regulation, 63 but regulators did nothing until 2008, when high rates of
default in subprime mortgages were on the cusp of creating a crisis in that
and other markets. Moreover, when the Agencies did act, they first issued a

58.
59.
60.
61.

See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2011).
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007).
Cuomo v. The Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721–22 (2009).
12 C.F.R. app. I, § 226 (listing agencies responsible for enforcing the Truth in Lending
Act); 12 C.F.R. § 227.1(c) (listing agencies responsible for enforcing the Unfair or Deceptive Acts
or Practices Act); see also CARPENTER, supra note 34, at 2.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2011) (enabling FTC to promulgate rules, policy statements, and
definitions regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b)(1), (e)(1), (i) (Federal Reserve Board and FDIC authority); 12 C.F.R. pt. 535 (2011)
(OTS authority); 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. C (OCC guidelines for establishing standards for
residential mortgage lending).
63. See, e.g., CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION
IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES STATUTES (2009),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. See generally Bar-Gil &
Warren, supra note 21 (advocating for a new federal regulating agency to improve the safety of
the consumer credit industry).
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non-binding recommendation rather than binding regulations.64 While the
Fed also held exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate regulations under the
Truth in Lending Act and might have amended Regulation Z to beef up
disclosures associated with residential mortgage lending, especially highpriced residential mortgages, it did not issue proposed revisions to the
Regulation Z mortgage rules until 2009, well too late to staunch the flames
of the subprime mortgage crisis.65
II. THE CFPB’S INDEPENDENCE
Dodd-Frank instills in the CFPB independence both from industry
actors and political forces looking to undermine the Bureau’s mission of
consumer protection.66 Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act creates the Bureau as
an “independent,” “autonomous” Bureau within the Federal Reserve.67 Its
autonomy from the Fed’s Board of Governors is assured by statute. DoddFrank expressly provides that the Board may not “intervene in any matter or
proceeding before the Director.”68 Similarly, no rule or order of the Bureau
is subject to approval or review of the Board of Governors; the Board also
cannot delay or prevent the issuance of such a rule.69 Nor can the Board
intervene in the CFPB’s examination or enforcement actions.70
Dodd-Frank designed the Bureau to be independent, not just from the
Fed, but also from other financial regulators, at least up to a point.
Independence is sought both structurally and financially. 71 The CFPB’s
financial independence substantially insulates it from political and industry
forces, but assuring the Bureau a steady source of funding does not alone
guarantee its independence. The CFPB is designed in a way that
distinguishes between its rulemaking and its enforcement authority.
Because Dodd-Frank grants exclusive rulemaking authority to the CFPB,
the Bureau is most independent as relates to the writing of new regulations.
Because the Act divides authority to enforce this regulation among federal

64. See Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation & Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 509–13
(2009).
65. Regulation Z, 74 Fed. Reg. 43232 (Aug. 26, 2009) proposed amendment to 12 C.F.R. pt.
226) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1, 226.4, 226.17, 226.18, 226.19, 226.20, 226.32, 226.36,
226.37, 226.38, (2010)).
66. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 72.
67. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1011(a), 1012(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–65
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(a), 5492(c) (2010)).
68. Id. § 1012(c)(2) (providing further that the Board may not “appoint, direct, or remove any
officer or employee of the Bureau . . . or merge or consolidate the Bureau, or any of the functions
or responsibilities of the Bureau, with any division or office of the Board of Governors or the
Federal reserve banks”).
69. Id. § 1012(c)(3).
70. Id. § 1012(c)(2)(A).
71. See generally Barkow, supra note 11 (providing the CFPB as an example of an agency that
has achieved independence through both structural and financial design).
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and state agents,72 however, the CFPB will at times be required to rely on
other regulators, thus importantly encroaching on the Bureau’s independence.
In enacting Dodd-Frank and creating the CFPB, Congress accepted the
claim that authority to promulgate consumer financial protection regulation
should be granted to a single federal regulator with exclusive jurisdiction
concerning all federal consumer finance laws and over all consumer lenders
and other related “covered persons.” Rather than continuing to divide this
jurisdiction among the FTC and an assortment of federal and state
prudential regulators, Dodd-Frank grants the Bureau “exclusive” authority
to promulgate regulations on fourteen specified “federal consumer financial
laws.”73 It also grants the Bureau additional authority to “prescribe rules
and issue orders and guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to
enable” it to “administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the
Federal consumer financial laws.” 74 In addition, it permits the Bureau to
issue regulations “identifying as unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or abusive” all
“acts or practices in connection with any transaction” by a “covered person
or service provider”75 with a consumer for a “consumer financial product or
service.” 76 Jurisdiction to regulate “unfair” and “deceptive” practices had
existed before Dodd-Frank, although this jurisdiction had been rarely used;
jurisdiction to regulate “abusive” practices was relatively new, but not
unprecedented in consumer protection regulation.77

72. Dodd Frank Act § 1042(a), 124 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552) (authorizing
state enforcement power); id. §§ 1025(c)(3), (e), 1026(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1991, 1994 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(c)(3), (e), 5516(d)(1)) (authorizing federal agencies’ enforcement power).
73. Id. § 1022(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 1031(b), 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531). The Dodd-Frank Act
defines a “covered person” as “any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer
financial product or service,” as well as “any affiliate of” or “service provider to” such person. Id.
§ 1002(6), 124 Stat. at 1956 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481). This term includes those offering a
“private education loan” or “consumer payday loan.” Id. § 1024(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5514). It also includes “a larger participant of a market for other consumer financial
products or services.” Id. § 1024(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1987. While the breadth of the term “larger
participant” is left undefined by Dodd-Frank, the Act also authorizes the Bureau, after
consultation with the FTC, to promulgate regulations defining this term. Id. § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat.
at 1987. On July 20, 2012, the CFPB issued its Final Rule on Defining Larger Participants. 12
C.F.R. pt. 1090, 77 Fed. Reg. 42874 (July 20, 2012). This rule became effective on September 30,
2012. Id. at 42874.
76. For definitions of “consumer financial product or service” and “financial product or
service,” see Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(5), (15), 124 Stat. at 1956, 1957–58 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5481).
77. For example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits specified “abusive”
collection practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (2011). For a recent article on the breadth of the
CFPB’s jurisdiction of “abusive” practices, see Carey Alexander, Abusive: Dodd-Frank Section
1031 and the Continuous Struggle to Protect Consumers, ST. JOHN'S LEGAL STUD. RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES, Mar. 2011 (paper no. 10-193), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719600.
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Congress also accepted, up to a point, the claim that enforcement
authority should be housed in a single federal regulator. While the CFPB
now enjoys exclusive enforcement jurisdiction over “too-big-to-fail” banks
with “total assets in excess of $10 billion” and nondepository “covered
persons,”78 Dodd-Frank leaves all enforcement authority over banks, credit
unions, and other financial institutions “with total assets of $10 billion or
less” with their prudential regulators. 79 Thus, the CFPB holds primary
enforcement authority because it has exclusive authority over too-big-to-fail
banks; however, enforcement as to the greatest number of banks—those not
too big to fail—falls on the prudential regulators. Should these regulators
fail to enforce the federal consumer financial laws against depository
lenders, Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB supplemental enforcement
authority.80 And as to nondepository consumer lenders, Dodd-Frank grants
exclusive enforcement authority to the CFPB. 81 Moreover, Dodd-Frank
governs other tertiary members of the financial services industry—
mortgage servicers, for example, and debt collectors. The CFPB holds
exclusive enforcement authority over these “covered persons,” who, before
enactment of Dodd-Frank, might have been subject to FTC or other
jurisdiction.82 The dividing line between persons remaining subject to FTC
jurisdiction and those “covered” by the CFPB remains less than clear cut
under Dodd-Frank; nonetheless, the Act directs the Bureau and the FTC to
negotiate “an agreement for coordinating with respect to enforcement
actions by each agency.”83
The logic of aggregating regulatory authority and some enforcement
authority in the Bureau is fairly simple: predatory subprime mortgages were
left virtually unregulated by federal agencies, who viewed mortgage lenders
as their “clients” rather than as the subjects of regulatory authority; lenders
“chose” their registration in large part by choosing the regulator that
presented the slimmest set of regulations or that sought to “deregulate”
through preemption of state enforcement action.84 Lenders would not have
78. Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(a)(1), (c), 124 Stat. at 1990–91 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515).
79. Id. § 1026, 124 Stat. at 1993 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516).
80. Id. § 1026(d)(2), 124 Stat. at 1994 (requiring the prudential regulator to respond to written
notices from the CFPB in situations where the CFPB believes there has been a material violation
of a Federal consumer financial law). Dodd-Frank also narrows preemption in this context so that
state regulators might find a toe-hold. See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer
Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1273, 1299 (2011).
81. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(c), 124 Stat. at 1989 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
82. Id. § 1024(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
83. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1989. For discussion of the Memorandum of
Understanding reached between the CFPB and FTC, see Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade
Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Pledge to Work Together to Protect
Consumers (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/ftccfpb.shtm.
84. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45 (noting the “unhealthy” competition between
the OCC and OTS in “attract[ing] regulated entities to charter with them to gain their operating
fees” by “us[ing] their regulatory authority to preempt state consumer protection laws that would

38

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

been able to choose among regulators if a single regulator had been charged
with consumer financial protection. Arguably, this regulatory competition
facilitated agencies’ “capture” by the industries they regulated.85 Whether
captured or simply suffering from denial, Congress placed some portion of
blame for the subprime mortgage crisis on the backs of federal regulators by
shifting authority to the new Bureau.
Moreover, Congress learned that capture might occur as much through
inaction as action. 86 Granting the CFPB exclusive rulemaking authority
does not guarantee that the Bureau will use this jurisdiction. Agency action
depends both on the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction as well as the will of
its governing body to regulate. An agency governing by a bipartisan panel
of commissioners might find itself internally deadlocked on whether and
how to proceed on regulatory action. In order to ensure that the Bureau was
not constrained by this sort of internal deadlock, Dodd-Frank structured the
CFPB so that it would be headed by a single, independent Director
appointed for a term of years.87
Commentators note that agency appointments for a term of years are
intended to permit appointees both to develop expertise on technical
subjects and to take “politically unpopular action.” 88 Unlike other
presidential appointments, which serve at the pleasure of the President and
might be removed on the basis of interest group influence, the Director, as
an appointee for a term of years, cannot be removed except “for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”89 Once appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Director guides
the CFPB for a five-year term.90 This term of years, thus, helps to protect
the Bureau from presidential interference after a Director has been
appointed. 91 Politically unpopular actions might be taken by a Director
appointed for a term of years because presidential influence occurs in the
choice of the Director but is substantially less following appointment. In

otherwise govern the activities” of these regulated entities); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 20.
85. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20, at 164; Barkow, supra note 11, at 44–45.
86. Cf. Barkow, supra note 11, at 37–41 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a
multimember commission over that of a single agency head).
87. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(b), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
88. Barkow, supra note 11, at 29.
89. Dodd-Frank Act § 1011(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1964–65 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
90. A Director sits until the next Director is appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate. Id. § 1011(c), 124 Stat. at 1964. Legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act makes clear
that Congress carefully considered alternate designs for the Bureau but decided that a single
director would better serve its intent. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 21, at 696.
91. See Barkow, supra note 11, at 29–30 (suggesting that the term of years “removal
restriction undoubtedly gives an agency head greater confidence to challenge presidential
pressure”).
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turn, longevity, expertise, and political independence also minimize the
possibility of industry capture.92
While Dodd-Frank provides that the CFPB’s Director cannot be
removed once appointed, it does not completely insulate the Bureau from
presidential influence. Presidential influence comes, ex ante, in the choice
of the individual nominated to hold the position of Director. Indeed, that the
Director sits for a five-year term means that most Presidents will influence
policy-making on consumer financial protection for a period that extends
beyond his own four-year term of office. As a result, this single-director
design gives the President that appoints a Director far more influence than
Congress. It should come as no surprise that the most controversial thing
about the CFPB is that a single director heads the Bureau rather than a
board of bipartisan commissioners with staggered terms. 93 While the
Bureau is not the only independent administrative agency in Washington,
D.C., it is the only independent agency headed by a single director.94 When
critics argue that the CFPB lacks accountability, they point to the fact that
the Bureau is run by a single director rather than a board of
commissioners.95
The Bureau is also made financially independent by statute; this
financial independence, again, removes an aspect of congressional authority
over the CFPB. 96 Once the Director determines the amount “reasonably
necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau under federal consumer
financial law,”97 that amount is payable out of the coffers of the Federal
Reserve. While Dodd-Frank sets a statutory cap on the portion of the Fed’s
budget available to the CFPB,98 estimates place this amount at almost twice
that of the FTC’s annual budget and about half that of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).99 The CFPB, thus, need not go to Congress
each year in search of an appropriation. The statute expressly provides that
the Director’s request for funding “shall not be subject to review by the
Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
92. See generally id. at 28–30.
93. See Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 2123, 2126.
94. See RICHARD PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCESS 101 (5th ed. 2009).
95. See Richard Shelby, The Danger of an Unaccountable “Consumer-Protection” Czar,
WALL ST. J., July 21, 2011, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424053111903554904576457931310814462.html.
96. See Recent Legislation, supra note 13, at 2125–26.
97. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1017(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1975 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2010)).
98. Dodd-Frank provides that the Bureau is entitled to receive not more than 10 to 12 percent
of the Fed’s annual budget. Id. § 1017(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 1975.
99. National Consumer Law Center, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Bureau
Structure, Independence and Funding, 29 NCLC REPORTS 6 (July/August 2010) (“The CFPB’s
budget will be set by the CFPB’s Director, up to a cap of about $485 million in 2013, adjusted for
inflation thereafter. By comparison, the Federal Trade Commission’s 2009 budget was $281
million and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s was $961 million.”).
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Senate.”100 While the Bureau’s budgets are subject to audit by the Office of
Management and Budget and the Comptroller General of the United
States, 101 these simply require the CFPB to account transparently for
expenditures after the fact; it does not limit the amount or type of
expenditures.
Almost from the day it was created with the enactment of Dodd-Frank,
the CFPB’s independence opened it to criticisms of unaccountability. The
timing of this controversy bears emphasis, because immediate and
vociferous opposition to the Bureau made it appear as though the CFPB
was forced on Congress—as though Congress did not enact legislation to
create the CFPB. But Dodd-Frank was enacted in mid-2010 just prior to
midterm elections during the Obama Administration. By late 2010,
disgruntled voters ensured that Democrats would no longer hold a majority
in both houses of Congress.102 The Tea Party emerged initially in reaction to
the Obama Administration’s handling of the bailout of large financial
institutions, but also found much to complain about in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Although political power did not shift until after enactment of DoddFrank and after midterm elections, Congress was surely not unaware of
these shifting political winds when it designed the CFPB as an independent
agency. The Bureau was structured with the expectation that it would need
to withstand immediate and fierce political resistance. It was designed to be
independent from both industry and political influence—from both
executive and congressional pressure.
Bills were introduced in the House almost immediately following
midterm elections during the Obama Administration. Some, like that
introduced by Rep. Michele Bachman, sought to repeal Dodd-Frank in
toto. 103 Other bills introduced in the House tinkered around the edges,
looking to effect changes in the governance structure of the CFPB or the
burden of proof to be met before regulating. 104 There were similar bills
100. Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1976 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497).
101. Id. § 1017(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1976.
102. Jeff A. Boehner, G.O.P. Captures House, but Not Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03elect.html.
103. H.R. 87, 112th Cong. (2011) (introduced by Rep. Michele Bachman on January 5, 2011 to
repeal Dodd-Frank Act); see also S. 712, 112st Cong. (2011) (Financial Takeover Repeal Act of
2011); S. 746, 112st Cong. (2011) (Dodd-Frank Repeal Act of 2011).
104. H.R. 557, 112th Cong. (2011) (transferring CFPB from Federal Reserve to Department of
Treasury and prohibiting Director of Treasury from interfering with new Bureau’s autonomy, but
cut off Bureau from financial benefits of Fed relationship); H.R. 480, 110th Cong. (2007)
(amending Truth in Lending Act to prohibit residential mortgage credit to consumers who lack
social security numbers); H.R 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (replacing single director of CFPB with
five-member commission composed of Vice Chairman of Federal Reserve plus four additional
presidential appointees); H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011) (Consumer Financial Protection Safety
and Soundness Improvement Act of 2011); H.R. 1355, 112th Cong. (2011) (Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection Accountability and Transparency Act of 2011); H.R. 1640, 112th Cong.
(2011) (subjecting CFPB to appropriations process and repeal its access to Federal Reserve
funds); H.R. 2612, 112th Cong. (2011) (repealing authority of CFPB to prohibit unfair, deceptive,
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introduced in the Senate as well.105 The Senate bills went nowhere, given
the Democratic majority in that house of Congress, but the House of
Representatives held hearings106 and reported out several of its bills.107 In July
21, 2011, just prior to the CFPB’s start date, the House passed H.R. 1315.108
While the Senate did not move forward either on the bills introduced
there or on the legislation previously enacted in the House, it held an
important card in thwarting the President’s ability to influence consumer
protection policy. Because the Director of the CFPB required the Senate’s
consent, a minority of Senators threatened filibuster and succeeded in
preventing appointment of a Director through normal means. 109 At first,
President Obama engineered around this threatened filibuster by appointing
Elizabeth Warren as a Consumer Czar,110 a position that required no Senate
approval; 111 but after the CFPB “went live” in July 2011, argument
circulated that the Bureau could not accomplish much of anything without a
Director. 112 Although by then President Obama had nominated Richard
Cordray for the position of Director (rather than Elizabeth Warren),
and abusive practices and promulgate regulations to prevent such practices); H.R. 4014, 112th
Cong. (2011) (making CFPB a “covered agency”); H.R. 1667, 112th Cong. (2011) (altering
“transfer date” under Dodd-Frank Act so that CFPB would not “go live” until confirmation of
director by Senate); H.R. 3044, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending Dodd-Frank Act to repeal Office
of Financial Research).
105. S. 2160, 112th Cong. (2012) (Financial Institutions Examination Fairness and Reform
Act); S. 737, 112th Cong. (2011) (replacing the Director of the CFPB with a five-person
commission and bringing the CFBP into the regular appropriations process); S. 3571, 112th Cong.
(2012) (requiring CFPB to conduct a small business review panel on qualified mortgage rule); S.
1615, 112th Cong. (2011) (Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011).
106. See, e.g., Oversight of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 112th Cong.
(2011), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-18.pdf.
107. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ACT OF 2011, H.R. REP.
NO. 89-112 (May 25, 2011) (reporting on H.R. 1315).
108. Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 – 2012) H.R.1315 - All Information,
THOMAS, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/112-2011/h621? (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
109. Whitehouse, President Obama News Conference, YOUTUBE (Sep. 10, 2010) at 22:15,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvwB0guyuNk&cc=1#t=1339s.
110. Brady Dennis & Scott Wilson, Warren Takes Post; Liberals Cheer, WASH. POST, Sept.
18, 2010, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/17
/AR2010091706828.html.
111. Presidential appointment of regulatory czars did not begin with Elizabeth Warren. Because
czars report only to the President and often are appointed to get around Senate confirmation fights,
their authority is contested, both politically and constitutionally. For debate on the legality and
wisdom of regulatory czars, see Jacqueline M. Weyand, Presidential Appointment of Czars:
Executive Power Play or Administrative Renewal?, 3 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 120 (2010); Aaron
J. Saiger, Obama’s ‘Czars’ for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011).
112. Although consumer advocates argued that this claim was based on a faulty reading of
Dodd-Frank’s provisions, see Lauren Saunders, Hurdle for Challengers to CFPB Recess
Appointment: Consumer Bureau Had Full Power With or Without a Director, NAT’L CONSUMER
LAW CTR. (February 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/regulatory_reform/issue-brief-cfpb
-interim-powers.pdf, few in the CFPB wanted to test the breadth of their regulatory authority
given the ideological slant of this Supreme Court.
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Republican members of the Senate announced that they would filibuster
any nominee for the position.113
Between July 2011 and January 2012, the CFPB worked under this
cloud of uncertainty. On January 4, 2012, Obama appointed Cordray to the
position under his Recess Appointment powers, although the Senate
technically had not recessed for its usual year-end break.114
Whether Cordray was properly appointed as Director of the CFPB is,
thus, itself subject to question.115 The constitutionality of his appointment,
as well as the CFPB’s regulatory and Directorial action since that
appointment, are sharply contested. In June 2012, suit was brought seeking
declaration that Cordray’s appointment and, indeed, the whole of DoddFrank are unconstitutional. 116 The CFPB and other defendants moved to
dismiss the suit in late 2012.117 Although the court has yet to rule on the suit
pending against the CFPB, it has ruled on a similar suit brought against the
NLRB. In Noel Canning v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
recently struck down the NLRB’s adjudication on the grounds that these
appointments were neither approved by the Senate nor authorized by the
Recess Appointments Clause.118 While the facts of the case pending against
the CFPB are distinguishable, commentators question whether Cordray’s
appointment as Director will withstand constitutional scrutiny.119 President
Obama recently nominated Cordray for a five-year term as Director. 120
While Senate approval of Cordray’s “re-appointment” would resolve
questions regarding the Director’s status going forward, there remains the
question of regulation and Directorial action previously taken by the CFPB.
Commentators differ, except on the notion that litigation is likely.121

113. 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation, SHELBY.SENATE.GOV (May
5, 2011), http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/5/44-u-s-sens-to-obama-no
-accountability-no-confirmation.
114. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/richard-cordray
-named-consumer-chief-in-recess-appointment.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
115. See V. Gerard Comizio & Amanda M. Jabour, Cordray’s Recess Appointment: Future
Legal Challenges, ABA BANKING L. COMM. J., Mar. 2012, http://apps.americanbar.org
/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201203/comizio-jabour.pdf.
116. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v.
Geithner, No. 1:12_CV-01032, 2012 WL 2365284 (D.D.C. Jun. 21, 2012).
117. Alan S. Kaplinsky, CFPB Moves to Dismiss Case Challenging Director Cordray’s Recess
Appointment, CFPB MONITOR (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2012/11/27/cfpb
-moves-to-dismiss-case-challenging-director-cordrays-recess-appointment/.
118. Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115, 12-1153, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
119. See Levitin, supra note 8.
120. Ben Protess & Benjamin Weiser, Obama’s Picks for Regulators Send a Message to Wall
Street, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Jan. 24, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013
/01/24/mary-jo-white-to-be-named-new-s-e-c-boss/?hp.
121. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CFPB’S ACCOUNTABILITY
The Dodd-Frank Act describes the CFPB as an “autonomous” bureau in
the Federal Reserve System, “independent” from both the Fed and other
administrative agencies. 122 This description of the CFPB is coupled with
provisions in Dodd-Frank that free the Bureau from the congressional
appropriations process; because the budget of the CFPB is payable from
revenue of the Federal Reserve, Congress cannot control the Bureau by
threatening to decrease or eliminate funding.123
Nonetheless, the CFPB sits in a regulatory space it shares with other
regulators. While the CFPB is more independent than most administrative
agencies, the Bureau holds institutional obligations to Congress, the FTC,
and the prudential regulators, including the newly created Council on
Financial Stability (the Council). While the FTC and prudential regulators
do not hold veto power over the Bureau, both Congress and the Council can
set aside CFPB regulation.124 Reversal is not as simple as some would like.
Nonetheless, the Bureau is, in important ways, accountable to these
officials.
Table 1 summarizes this statutory division of labor. It categorizes the
CFPB’s accountability according to source (congressional, prudential
regulators, FTC, and the Council) and subject (rulemaking, supervision and
monitoring of depository institutions, enforcement, and oversight).
TABLE 1: CFPB OVERSIGHT AND OVERLAPPING REGULATORY
OBLIGATIONS WITHIN DODD-FRANK
Council
Rulemaking

Congress

Section
1023

Supervision,
Monitoring
Enforcement
Oversight

Prudential
and other
regulators
Sections
1015, 1022
Sections
1025, 1026
Sections
1025, 1026

FTC
Section 1022
Sections
1024, 1027,
1029
Sections
1024, 1027,
1029

Sections
1016, 1013

122. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1011, 1012, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964–66 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5492, 5493 (2010)).
123. Nor can Congress indirectly control the budget of the CFPB by cutting the budget of the
Fed. Id. § 1017(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1975 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497).
124. Id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).
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Because references in the table are merely statutory provisions within
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Table’s complicated summary requires
elaboration. These statutory provisions are described below.
A. RULEMAKING
Dodd-Frank provides that the Director has broad authority to “prescribe
rules and issue orders and guidance.”125 Although this rulemaking authority
is “exclusive,” 126 it is subject to specific burdens of proof set out in the
Act.127 The Bureau’s rulemaking authority is also tempered by procedural
requirements set in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 128 which
govern all administrative agencies’ rulemaking, including that by the CFPB.
Because the APA requires notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunities
for public comment by interested actors (whether industry or consumer
advocates),129 it provides a sort of intellectual roadmap of interest groups’
influence in the process.130
The CFPB’s exclusive rulemaking authority is also subject to oversight
by other financial regulators. Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to “consult
with the appropriate prudential regulators or other Federal agencies prior to
proposing a rule,”131 and, where regulators object to its proposals during the
comment phase of rulemaking, to publish these written objections.132 While
neither private actors nor prudential regulators can veto the Bureau’s
proposed regulation, it would be a mistake to conclude that the CFPB can
simply ignore their regulatory commentary. Moreover, Dodd-Frank subjects
the Bureau to the possibility that its financial regulations will be “stayed” or
“set aside” by the Council.133 These limits, as well as the regulatory burdens
of proof, are each discussed in turn.
1. Burdens of Proof
Several regulatory burdens of proof built into Dodd-Frank are likely to
inhibit CFPB regulation on a given topic. Like many agencies, the CFPB
must assess the costs and benefits of any proposed regulation.134 A cost-

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. § 1022(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
Id. § 1022(b)(4), 124 Stat. at 1981.
See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2011)).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2011).
130. Political scientists view the APA as providing Congress with an important source of
information about agency policy making. See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 25, at 94–97.
131. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
132. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1981.
133. Id. § 1023(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).
134. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512) (requiring the
Bureau to consider “the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including
the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial products or services
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benefit equation that compares concentrated costs to diffuse benefits is
likely to overemphasize costs over benefits simply because diffuse benefits
will be more difficult to quantify, and Dodd-Frank is not distinct in this
regard. 135 Moreover, when regulating unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices, Dodd-Frank overlays a second cost-benefit analysis. It defines
“unfair” to require the Bureau to conclude that the questionable practice “is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers” that is not “reasonably
avoidable by consumers” and “is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits.” 136 Similarly, the Act defines “abusive” practices as limited to
those “materially” interfering with “the ability of a consumer to understand
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service,” or that take
“unreasonable advantage” consumers.137 Thus, high burdens of proof limit
the Bureau’s grant of regulatory authority.
Relying on these statutorily imposed burdens, political and industry
interests can work to push back against an independent CFPB. For example,
Dodd-Frank defines key terms such as “unfair” and “abusive” in ways that
allow for arguments by industry that a practice may be problematic but not
sufficiently problematic to justify regulation.138 More importantly, section
1022(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFPB to consider “the
potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including
the potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial
products of services resulting from such rule.”139 Because this cost-benefit
analysis requires a balancing of concentrated costs and diffuse costs against
diffuse benefits, it seems to favor a finding that costs exceed benefits. That
conservative analysts criticize regulations recently proposed by the CFPB
as failing to satisfy this standard supports a conclusion that this cost-benefit

resulting from such rule”); id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring consideration of “the impact on . . .
covered persons” and “on consumers in rural areas”).
135. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and the Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 65 (2011); see also supra notes 17–18 and accompanying
text.
136. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
137. Id. § 1031(d), 124 Stat. at 2006.
138. Dodd-Frank’s definitions are far from bright-line rules. Dodd-Frank provides that an act or
practice is unfair when it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers [and] such substantial injury is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” Id. § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006
(emphasis added). It similarly defines an abusive act or practice as one that “materially interferes
with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial product
or service [or] takes unreasonable advantage of” a consumer’s lack of understanding, the inability
of the consumer to protect his own interests, or the “reasonable reliance by the consumer on a
covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.” Id. § 1031(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006
(emphasis added).
139. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i), 124 Stat. at 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
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analysis favors industry interests, and may suggest the possibility of future
litigation on this basis.140
2. Regulatory “Consultation”
Dodd-Frank requires the Bureau to “consult” with the appropriate
prudential regulators or other federal agencies prior to proposing a rule and
during the comment process “regarding the consistency with prudential,
market, or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.” 141 This
section further provides that a prudential regulator may submit a “written
objection” to the proposed rule;142 if it does so, the Bureau must include in
its adopting release “a description of the objection and the basis for the
Bureau’s decision, if any, regarding this objection.”143
While these provisions do not grant prudential regulators or other
federal agencies a veto on the Bureau’s proposed regulation, pragmatic
consequences would likely follow the requirement that the CFPB record
both the competing regulator’s written objection and its response in the
regulatory record. Depending on circumstances, the Bureau may look to
avoid this public critique by anticipating and addressing such objections
before dueling paperwork is submitted to the public record.
The precise contours and implications of this interagency consultation
requirement are still somewhat opaque. Interagency regulatory consultation
obligations are not unique to the CFPB. On one hand, a statute may include
a purely discretionary statement that one agency “may consult” with
another;144 on the other hand, a statute might mandate that two agencies
engage in joint rulemaking.145 Between these two extremes lie statutes that
“require consultation before an agency can take certain actions, even though
how an agency should treat the substance of the interaction remains highly
discretionary.”146
Dodd-Frank fits in this grey zone. While it requires the CFPB to consult
with the “appropriate” regulators before proposing new consumer financial

140. See, e.g., Mark A. Calabria, The CFPB: Problem of Solution?, CATO INST., http://www
.cato.org/publications/commentary/cfpb-problem-or-solution (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
141. Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
142. Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1981.
143. Id. But see id. § 1022(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (specifying “the deference that a court
affords to the Bureau” should be “as if the Bureau were the only agency authorized to apply,
enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions of such Federal consumer financial law”).
144. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1157 (citing to section 3 of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(3) (2011), “which provides that when
considering any application for pesticide registration, the EPA Administrator ‘may consult’ with
any other federal agency”).
145. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1165–73 (discussing joint rulemaking).
146. Id. at 1158 (describing section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, “which requires federal
agencies to consult with the federal fish and wildlife agencies responsible for administering the
Act to ensure that their proposed major actions are ‘not likely to jeopardize’ protected species”).
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protection regulations and “during the comment process”; 147 it does not
require the Bureau to defer to another regulator’s determination that the
proposed rule would be inconsistent with the “prudential, market, or
systemic objectives administered by such agencies.”148 It merely requires
that written objections be included in the regulatory record. Nonetheless,
similar purely procedural requirements of consultation have been described
as imposing “a powerful interagency lever”149 on the grounds that, although
the principal agency retains considerable discretion, in practice this sort of
provision “can function as a veto because disregarding recommendations
can expose an agency to civil and criminal penalties and because deviation
may render a decision arbitrary and capricious on judicial review.” 150
Whether Dodd-Frank will be construed in this way remains an open
question, but the CFPB is likely to avoid litigation of the issue by trying to
reach agreement before a written objection is lodged.
Interagency consultation can advance both congressional and
presidential interests. Requirements that agencies consult each other before
regulating can establish “a monitoring mechanism that can supplement
congressional oversight.” 151 It might, at the same time, “bolster the
President’s power by creating an avenue through which agencies might
‘lobby’ each other to advance the President’s prerogatives.”152 Importantly,
this sort of shared regulatory space can challenge industry influence
because interest groups are required to assert influence in multiple locations
simultaneously. In the case of financial regulation, where this influence can
concentrate either on promoting favorable or resisting unfavorable
regulation, containing capture could be more difficult than with other issue
areas, even within a shared regulatory space, since benefits or costs are
particularly concentrated and industry interests are particularly powerful
and well financed.
3. Regulatory Stay and Set Aside
Dodd-Frank also creates a sort of “super prudential regulator”—the
Financial Stability Oversight Council.153 The Act grants the Council juris147. The reference to “comment process” undoubtedly refers to the requirements of the APA,
including 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
148. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1022(b)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1981 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
149. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1158; see also Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do:
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 52–
57 (2009).
150. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1158. The Supreme Court has agreed with Freeman
and Rossi’s pragmatic assessment. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (“[W]hile the
Service’s Biological Opinion theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’ . . . in reality it has a
powerful coercive effect on the action agency . . . .”).
151. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1160.
152. Id. at 1160–61.
153. Dodd-Frank Act § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392–93 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The members
of the Council include the Secretary of the Treasury (who serves as Chairperson), the Chairman of
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diction both to stay implementation of regulations promulgated by the
Bureau and, ultimately, to “set aside” or veto its rules.154 The standard for
“set aside” is high. Dodd-Frank permits this extreme remedy only if the
Council decides “that the regulation or provision [of a regulation] would put
the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the
stability of the financial system of the United States at risk.”155 Moreover, a
decision of the Council—a group of nine regulators and one presidential
appointee—to set aside a regulation on this basis can be made “only with
the affirmative vote” of “two thirds of the members of the Council.”156
Unlike the consultation requirements discussed above, the Council does
hold a veto power. Council interference with the regulatory authority of the
CFPB can occur with the concurrence of seven members of the Council.157
Although, the standard for a Council set aside is high, in all likelihood, the
Council’s determination would be subject to Chevron deference.158 Would a
court substitute its own judgment for that of the Council that the
complained of regulation threatens the safety and soundness of the U.S.
banking system or the financial stability of the U.S. financial system? If so,
the pragmatic implications of this authority are probably far wider than the
narrow parameters set forth in the statute and almost undoubtedly reach
back to any written objection filed during the comment process if submitted
by an agency with a seat on the Council.
This potential for regulatory veto provides enormous opportunity for
executive influence on the CFPB’s exercise of its rulemaking authority.
Many of the Council seats are themselves presidential appointees and are,
thus, unlikely to vote contrary to the President’s wishes. The very public
nature of the process through which the Council considers whether to set
aside a regulation issued by the CFPB also provides each of the members of
the Council with another opportunity to lobby the Bureau about its policies
and proposed regulations. Given the likely crisis that a set aside is meant to

the Board of Governors, the Comptroller of the Currency, the CFPB Director, the SEC Chairman,
the FDIC Chairperson, the CFTC Chairperson, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and “an independent
member appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having
insurance expertise.” Id.
154. Id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513). The Chair of the Council
can provisionally stay the effectiveness of a CFPB regulation on request of a single member of the
Council. Id. § 1023(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1985. This stay is effective for no more than a ninety-day
period. Id. § 1023(c)(1). The request for a stay and ultimately a set aside of such a regulation is
related to the consultation requirement specified in section 1023(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1985, in
that a petition for a stay must allege a good faith attempt “to resolve concerns regarding the effect
of the rule” on safety and soundness or financial stability. Id. § 1023(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 1985.
155. Id. § 1023(a), 124 Stat. at 1985.
156. Id. § 1023(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1985–86.
157. Id.
158. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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avert, behind-the-scenes presidential involvement in the process is also to
be expected.
The public nature of this debate also presents Congress with both a
source of information about the CFPB’s rulemaking and an opportunity for
involvement. In addition, Congress independently holds authority to reverse
any regulation promulgated by the CFPB through additional legislation.
Thus, if the Council fails to set aside a controversial regulation, Congress
might itself step in and set aside the rule.159
H.R. 1315, the Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness
Improvement Act (the Improvement Act), would make it easier for the
Council to veto CFPB regulation by softening the standard for set aside.
Rather than require a showing that the regulation in question would put the
safety and soundness of the banking system or the stability of the financial
system “at risk,” the Council could veto a regulation if it were found to be
“inconsistent” with the safe and sound operations of this system. 160
Similarly, rather than require the Council to vote by a two-thirds majority,
the Improvement Act would set aside a regulation on the basis of a simple
majority.161 But the difference between the 66 percent currently required for
reversal and the 50 percent that H.R. 1315 would instead require would
effect little in practice because each of the members of the Council are
themselves presidential appointees. While dissent within the Council is
politically unlikely, even the slimmest possibility of set aside is likely to
chill CFPB regulatory action.
B. ENFORCEMENT, EXAMINATION, AND SUPERVISION
Whatever regulation the CFPB succeeds in issuing, it may need to rely
on other regulators to enforce them. The CFPB may be the exclusive
regulator of consumer financial protection, but it must share enforcement
jurisdiction with a complex assortment of federal and state regulators. This
section details this shared enforcement authority.
1. Coordination of Supervision and Enforcement
Before enactment of Dodd-Frank, regulators competed to determine
who held exclusive enforcement authority. In notable instances, this was a
race to the bottom to see who could regulate consumer lenders less. 162
Unlike rulemaking authority, which Dodd-Frank grants exclusively to the
159. Of course, legislation reversing a CFPB regulation would require approval by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate and an absence of presidential veto. If the President were
to veto such a bill, Congress could still enact such legislation, but with the approval of a vetoproof supermajority. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
160. Id. § 3.
161. Id. § 2.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. See generally ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 20,
at pt. 3.
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Bureau, enforcement and supervisory authority remains divided under the
statute depending on the type of consumer lender at issue.
Most view the CFPB as the “primary” enforcement agency of consumer
financial protection regulation. 163 But that assessment, while accurate on
average, glosses over the numerous ways in which the CFPB shares
enforcement authority.
a. Very Large Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions
Dodd-Frank grants the Bureau exclusive supervisory authority over
“very large banks, savings associations and credit unions,” and “primary”
authority to “enforce” the federal consumer finance laws against these very
large banks.164 Its supervisory powers grant the CFPB “exclusive authority”
to examine very large banks to assess their compliance with the federal
consumer financial laws and related risk to consumers and markets for
consumer financial products and services. 165 Since this examination
authority is limited in scope to the consumer financial laws, however,
Dodd-Frank creates overlaps in supervisory jurisdiction, which it resolves
by requiring the CFPB and the prudential regulator to coordinate
supervision of the “very large banks.”166
Express authority to enforce laws that have been violated bolsters this
supervisory authority. Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB “primary authority to
enforce” the federal consumer financial laws as against very large banks.167
Because the Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction over very large banks is not
exclusive, however, Dodd-Frank also specifies the “backup enforcement
authority” of other federal agencies.168 The Act provides that any federal
agency other than the FTC can recommend, in writing, to the CFPB that
they initiate an enforcement proceeding. 169 If the CFPB does not bring
action within 120 days, the other agency can itself commence an
enforcement proceeding.170

163. Barkow, supra note 11, at 76 (“The CFPB has primary enforcement responsibility vis-à-vis
other federal agencies that may be authorized to bring federal consumer finance actions.”).
164. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1025(b)(1), (c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1990, 1991
(2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515 (2010)). Very large banks, savings associations, and credit
unions are defined as those respective entities with total assets exceeding $10 billion. Id.
§ 1025(a). For distinction between supervisory and enforcement powers, see Cuomo v. The
Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721 (2009).
165. Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(b)(1)(A), (C), 124 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515).
166. Id. § 1025(e)(1), 124 Stat. at 1991; see also Memorandum of Understanding on
Supervisory Coordination (May 16, 2012) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/press/bcreg/bcreg20120604a1.pdf (specifying coordination between CFPB and the Prudential
Regulators regarding enforcement and supervisory actions involving very large banks).
167. Dodd-Frank Act § 1025(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1991 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515).
168. Id. § 1025(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1991.
169. Id. § 1025(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1991.
170. Id. § 1025(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1991.
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b. Other Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions
Dodd-Frank grants to the CFPB examination and enforcement authority
over banks, savings associations, and credit unions whose total assets are
$10 billion or less,171 but as to these banks the Bureau’s role is as a backup
enforcement authority. The Act permits the Director of the CFPB to require
reports from these not-so-very-large financial institutions, although it
directs the Bureau to use pre-existing reports or publicly available data “to
the fullest extent possible.” 172 The CFPB also can audit the primary
prudential regulator’s examination reports to “assess” the bank’s
“compliance with the Federal consumer finance laws.”173
Despite these powers of examination, the CFPB holds no independent
power of enforcement against these banks. If the CFPB has reason to
believe “a material violation” of such laws has occurred, it can “notify the
prudential regulators in writing and recommend appropriate action to
respond.” 174 But, in general, the prudential regulator for these financial
institutions holds “exclusive authority (relative to the Bureau) to enforce”
the federal consumer finance laws.175
While Dodd-Frank attempts to set clear regulatory boundaries between
the CFPB and these prudential regulators, issues are bound to arise on the
margins. In anticipation of the potential for dispute regarding these “other
banks,” the Act also specifies that the CFPB is required to coordinate with
federal prudential regulators and state bank regulators “to minimize
regulatory burden.” 176 Although nothing in the statute expressly requires
prudential regulators to maximize their protection of consumers’ financial
decision making, coordination should be interpreted to minimize the
regulatory burden of duplicated efforts rather than minimization of
regulatory effort altogether. It should also be interpreted to minimize the
possibility that enforcement of the federal consumer financial laws is
distinct depending on the agency with primary enforcement jurisdiction.
Large banks with assets in excess of $10 billion should face the same
enforcement energy as smaller banks with total assets of less than $10
billion. Dodd-Frank does not answer, however, whether enforcement
interests of the CFPB or of the other regulators should prevail.
c. Other Consumer Lenders, Service Providers, and Related
“Covered Persons”
In addition, the CFPB’s enforcement authority extends to consumer
lenders, service providers, and others that are “nondepository covered
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. § 1026(a), 124 Stat. at 1993 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516).
Id. § 1026(b), 124 Stat. at 1994–95.
Id. § 1026(c), 124 Stat. at 1994.
Id. § 1026(d)(2), 124 Stat. at 1994.
Id. § 1026(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 1994.
Id. § 1024(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1988 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
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persons.” While the CFPB does not share with any prudential regulator
enforcement responsibility over these sorts of “covered persons,” it also
does not hold sole authority over them. As to these “nondepository covered
persons,” the CFPB shares enforcement authority with the FTC.177
The contours of this shared regulatory jurisdiction are complex. DoddFrank specifies that the CFPB hold supervisory and enforcement
jurisdiction over any “covered person” who:


“offers or provides origination, brokerage, or servicing” of loans
secured by residential mortgages, “or loan modification or
foreclosure relief services in connection with such loans.”



“offers or provides to a consumer a private education loan,” or



“offers or provides to a consumer a payday loan.”178

It also specifies that the Bureau has jurisdiction over any “covered
person” that “is a larger participant of a market for other consumer financial
products or services,” 179 but left specification of this “larger participant”
concept for later regulation in consultation with the FTC. 180 The final
“larger participant” regulation became effective early this year.181
Dodd-Frank provides that the CFPB “shall” require reports and conduct
periodic examinations of “nondepository covered persons,” 182 but also
specifies that this examination function should be conducted to “minimize
regulatory burden”183 and must be coordinated with the federal and state
prudential regulators exercising supervisory activities. 184 Again, examination is distinct from enforcement authority. Here, Dodd-Frank grants the
CFPB “exclusive authority to enforce the Federal consumer financial law”
relating to these nondepository covered persons. 185 Nonetheless, the Act
permits “[a]ny federal agency authorized to enforce [the] Federal consumer
financial law” to recommend initiation of an enforcement action.186 It also
specifically requires the CFPB and FTC to “negotiate an agreement for
coordinating with respect to enforcement actions by each agency,”187 a task
the two agencies completed in 2012.188
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. § 1024(c)(3), 124 Stat. at 1989.
Id. §§ 1024, (a)(1)(A), (D), (E), 124 Stat. at 1987.
Id. § 1024(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1987.
Id. § 1024(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 1987.
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090, 77 Fed. Reg. 42874 (July 20, 2012) (providing that this final rule is
to become effective Jan. 2, 2013).
182. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
183. Presumably, this standard should be construed consistent with the same standard set in
section 1024(b)(3). For discussion of this standard, see supra note 176 and accompanying text.
184. Dodd-Frank Act § 1024(b)(3), 124 Stat. at 1988 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
185. Id. § 1024(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 1989.
186. Id. § 1024(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1989 (providing that this recommendation be in writing).
187. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1989. Short of requiring this interagency agreement to be
negotiated, the Act does not specify whether it would be enforceable or subject to judicial review.
While Dodd-Frank did not otherwise set the terms of this interagency agreement, it suggests the
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2. General Duty to Coordinate
In addition to the consultation and coordination otherwise specified in
the Act, Dodd-Frank also requires the Bureau to “coordinate” with the SEC,
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC), the FTC, and
other federal agencies and state regulators “as appropriate to promote
consistent regulatory treatment of consumer financial and investment
products and services.”189 While it nowhere explicitly defines these duties
of coordination, duties of coordination presumably differ from the
consultation requirements otherwise specified in the Act. “Regulatory
treatment” may refer to coordination of rulemaking authority to avoid
inconsistent treatment of similar or related market actors, although the
distinction between permitting consultation and requiring coordination on
regulation is unclear. “Regulatory treatment” may instead refer to
coordination of examination and enforcement actions, although Dodd-Frank
elsewhere specifies similar obligations of coordination. 190 Finally, this
provision may be construed to permit negotiation of a memorandum of
understanding with the CFPB, although an express statutory authority to
enter into an interagency agreement may be unnecessary.191
C. OVERSIGHT
1. Congressional Testimony and Reports
Although Congress does not control the Bureau’s purse strings, DoddFrank nonetheless requires the Bureau to account to Congress annually. It
requires the Director to provide semiannual testimony at hearings before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, as well as the
House Committees on Financial Services and on Energy and Commerce,
where presumably members of Congress will submit their own questions to
the Director. 192 The Director is also required to provide to these
congressional committees and to the President “a report” on the Bureau’s
“rules of the road” to be followed when civil actions are brought either by the Bureau or the FTC.
Id. § 1024(c)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1989. The Act also permits the two agencies to “modify or
supersede” these recommendations by agreement. Id. § 1024(c)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 1989.
Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) have been negotiated between administrative agencies in
the past, some voluntarily, some required by statute, but “there appears to be no generally
applicable statutory or executive branch policy regarding the use of MOUs, leaving their content
largely to the discretion of the agencies.” Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1161.
188. Memorandum of Understanding between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and
the Federal Trade Commission (May 16, 2012), http://ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123ftc-cfpb
-mou.pdf.
189. Dodd-Frank Act § 1015, 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5495).
190. See, e.g., id. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–31 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (providing that the
federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the CFTC shall consult and coordinate with each other in
developing regulations with respect to the “Volcker Rule”).
191. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 24, at 1161.
192. Dodd-Frank Act § 1016, 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5496).
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activities on nine statutorily specified topics 193 and on the consumer
complaints received by the Bureau.194
The informational access that this oversight jurisdiction provides is
considerable. While Congress undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction to
investigate an agency based on specific complaints it receives, broader
oversight jurisdiction granted to specific congressional committees means
that Congress does not need to rely on complaints to trigger a review.
Moreover, specifying monitoring functions can ensure that congressional
committees keep a close watch on the Bureau’s activities, while also
preventing jurisdictional disputes as to which congressional committees the
CFPB need report.
Congress may not be able to cut the CFPB’s budget under Dodd-Frank,
but it can count on multiple opportunities for public congressional
testimony and related press conferences every year. 195 Reporting and
testimonial obligations keep Congress informed on CFPB rulemaking and
other regulatory activity; congressional committees can make the Director
and other CFPB bureaucrats squirm at these public events.
Most importantly, congressional review provides a forum for
threatening to use “the big club around the door”—repeal of disfavored
regulation or even wholesale dismantling of the Bureau. 196 Oversight
jurisdiction is an important step in publicly signaling congressional
displeasure with a particular policy decision. These hearings permit
members of Congress to gather information to assist in their own legislative
agenda. They also permit Congress opportunities to invite industry actors
and other administrative agencies to react to testimony.
Although the Bureau is designed to be insulated from congressional
intervention, the CFPB ignores congressional criticism at its peril.
193. Id. § 1016(c)(1)–(9), 124 Stat. at 1974–75 (requiring “a discussion of the significant
problems faced by consumers in shopping for or obtaining consumer financial products or
services,” “a justification of the budget request of the previous year,” a list of significant rules and
other initiatives adopted or created by the Bureau in the preceding year, an analysis of consumer
complaints received by the Bureau, a list of the “public supervisory and enforcement actions” that
the Bureau participated in during the preceding year, the Bureau’s actions taken against covered
persons which are not credit unions or depository institutions, “an assessment of significant
actions” by state attorneys general or regulators related to federal consumer financial law, “an
analysis of the efforts of the Bureau to fulfill the fair lending mission of the Bureau,” and “an
analysis of the efforts of the Bureau to increase workforce and contracting diversity consistent
with the procedures established by the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion”). The CFPB
may also submit this report to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Id. § 1016(b), 124 Stat. at 1974
194. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 1969 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493). Dodd-Frank also
requires the CFPB to share this data on consumer complaints with the FTC and the prudential
regulators. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 1969.
195. Id. § 1016, 124 Stat. at 1974 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5496).
196. McNollgast, supra note 25, at 1651 (citing Barry R. Weingast, The CongressionalBureaucratic System: A Principle Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB.
CHOICE 147, 155 (1984)).

2012]

Accountability and the CFPB

55

Oversight jurisdiction provides Congress with an opportunity to formalize
these complaints; it also provides the CFPB with a clear forum for
articulating its side of the debate.
CONCLUSION
The CFPB is designed so that the Bureau might rise above the client
politics that normally surround financial regulation and protect the diffuse
interests of consumers even after concerns about the subprime mortgage
crisis abate.
Like many agencies, the CFPB is vested with jurisdiction of several
different sorts. Because Congress granted the CFPB “exclusive” rulemaking
authority, the Bureau’s independence is greatest when it issues regulations.
This ostensibly “exclusive” regulatory authority is, however, subject to
oversight, consultation, and coordination.
The CFPB is less independent when viewed as an enforcement agent.
Its enforcement authority is not exclusive. Given that regulation is only as
effective as regulators are willing to enforce this law in the books this
shared enforcement jurisdiction holds the key to the CFPB’s accountability
to political and industry forces. Dodd-Frank divides the Bureau’s power to
monitor and enforce the federal consumer financial laws in complex ways
between federal and state authorities. While the CFPB holds greater
enforcement authority over “large banks, savings associations, and credit
unions,” its ability to examine even these “large banks” is shared with
prudential regulators. With banks and other financial institutions with assets
of $10 billion or less, the CFPB must rely on the relevant prudential
regulator to enforce consumer financial protection regulation. And as to
“covered persons” that are not banks, Dodd-Frank was also clear to retain
the FTC as a contiguous regulator.
The CFPB’s rulemaking and enforcement authorities are importantly
interconnected. Because the Bureau shares enforcement jurisdiction with
the OCC, the NCUA, and other bank regulators, as a practical matter, it will
have to take prudential regulators’ concerns into account when
promulgating regulations. Thus, while only the Financial Stability Council
can veto a regulation promulgated by the Bureau, CFPB regulations might
well be undermined by other regulators’ inaction as enforcement agents.
Dodd-Frank crafts a complex regulatory space. This complex space
means that descriptions of the CFPB’s jurisdiction are best portrayed as
Venn diagrams. A prudential regulator cannot alone veto a regulation issued
by the CFPB, but it can comment on it in the public record, lobby for the
Council to set it aside, and thwart enforcement efforts. Moreover, although
the CFPB is financially independent and headed by a single director,
Congress can exert influence on the Bureau through its influence on other
administrative agencies. It can reverse CFPB regulation legislatively. It can
repeal the legislation that created the Bureau.

56

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB the power to promulgate consumer
financial protection regulation that political actors disparage, but also
creates incentives for crafting a consensus among regulators. Because the
Bureau is designed so that it is accountable to a wide range of political
actors, it just might accomplish the sort of effective consumer protection
regulation that eluded earlier regulators.

